Abstract: Voice over IP is one of the fastest growing internet based application in today's networking world. As more and more enterprises are moving towards IP based voice network, security has become an important issue. The type of threats that voice traffic is exposed to is similar to those experienced by normal data traffic. However with voice traffic, the issues are much more complicated. While it is important to protect the voice packets from spoofing and eavesdropping, it is equally important that law enforcement agencies have access to these voice packets. With the recent terrorist attacks and increased threat to national security,, law enforcement agencies require the ability to tap voice calls and screen them for information pertaining to national security. With the deployment of security mechanisms like encryption, it isl becoming harder for law enforcement agencies to decipher the information hidden in these IP packets related to voice calls. Hence, it is important that the security mechanism used in these voice calls be standardized. This would provide law enforcement agencies easier access to the information during crisis situations. In this paper, the authors propose a new security mechanism that will help law enforcement agencies in gathering information pertaining to national safety. Initial analysis carried out by the authors indicates that the overhead caused by the proposed protocol has a minimal effect on the voice communication performance.
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Rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, the authors discuss the issues related to VoIP and law enforcement. In Section III, the authors present the proposed CALEA compliant VoIP security system. In Section IV, the authors describe the working of the proposed protocol. In Section V, the authors discuss the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed protocol. In the last Section (Section VI), the authors present their conclusions and future work. Table I indicates that as the complexity of the encryption algorithm increases, time required for deciphering the message also increases. Therefore, it is likely that negative elements in the society will start using VoWP to carry out unlawful activities. This would hinder law enforcement agencies' ability to apprehend these elements and provide safety to the lawful citizens. Once the source and destination agree on that protection suite, they then exchange keying material that will be used to create the key used to encrypt the conversation. After the keys are set up, the source and destination exchange identification information using the key and protection suite agreed on in the earlier packets. Once all packets are sent, the call setup process begins.
II. VOP AND LAW
New Encryption Packet: After the key exchange process is completed, the gateways send the proposed packet to their respective service provider gateways. That packet is sent for two reasons: to provide extra security to the call setup phase and to guarantee that the ISP gateways obtain the key and session ID information. If this packet is not sent by the source or destination gateways to their service provider gateways, the call will be dropped before the call setup begins. In other words, if the service provider gateways do not receive the new packet, the VoWP calls will never be complete. Figures 1 and 2 show the proposed packet structure of this protocol (based on the standard Ethernet packet). field is where the encryption key is located. As shown in Figure 2 , the response packet for the original encryption packet will be exactly the same, except the sequence and key fields will be absent. This is because the key will not be sent back to the local gateway since it created the key initially. The sequence field is also absent because the service provider gateway will always use the same SID for that particular conversation.
Changes to Control and Voice Packets: SID is the only field that will be added to the control packets and the voice. This will make it easier to determine what control packets are associated with the requested call. VoWP uses a variety of signaling protocols to set up and tear down the call. Each of those signaling protocols have different packet formats. Therefore, the author proposes to use the options field in the IP header to insert the SID. This field was chosen because all IP packets will be able to support the options field, so the SID location will not be dependent on the signaling protocol. This will also make it much easier to locate the SID since it will be in the same location for every packet. The DG and SG fields in this packet are the local gateways for the source and destination phones, not the service provider gateways. The SID is the most important field in this packet; it is used to identify packets as being voice packets and to determine what packets belong to a certain conversation. The SID field in the very first encryption packet that is sent from the local gateways will initially be all zeros. If the key is changed later, then the SID field will contain the SID that the service provider gateway assigned in the first encryption packet exchange. The process of SBD insertion into the voice packet will be described later.
The sequence number field is useful for determining the most recent encryption packet. For example, the key could be changed every few seconds to make the call more secure, so the sequence field will indicate the most recent key. The key The copied flag will be set to 1 so that the SID will be included in all fragments if fragmentation is used. The options class will be set to 0 since the SID is basically for control purposes. The number 25 will be used for the option number.
IV. PROTOCOL DESCRIPTION
Now that the basic concepts of this new protocol have been explained, the process will be explained step-by-step as shown in Figure 4 [11, 12] 11. GW2 Key Exchange (contains Diffie-Hellman public key), Nonce, additional payloads (depending on authentication method) [14] . It is worth noting that all packets are encrypted from this point on.
12. GWl sends an Identification, Hash [14] . 13. GW2 sends an Identification, Hash [14] . 14. GWl sends Security Association (contains proposals), Identification (contains secure traffic description), and a
Nonce. This stage is for the IPSEC SA negation, the previous steps were for ISAKMP SA negotiations [14] . 15. GW2 responds with its Security Association (contains the selected proposal), Identification (contains secure traffic description), and Nonce [14] . 16. GW1 sends a Hash payload that provides verification and replay protection [14] . 17. The proposed protocol now begins. 18. GWl sends the new encryption packet to SPGWI with the encryption key. From the data presented in Table 1 , it is evident that law enforcement agencies would not be able to decipher encrypted calls in real-time without having the encryption key. Therefore, if law enforcement agencies already had the key they would be able to decrypt the conversation in real-time. Table 2 is an example of the amount of time required to encrypt and decrypt data using RC6 with an 8 bit processor.
The data was collected using Intel's MCS 51 microcontroller.
Comparing the data in Table 1 and 2, it is evident that the availability of the encryption key greatly reduces the amount of time spent on information gathering.
Other advantages to this protocol are its simplicity and its ability to be used with almost any Internet-related protocol.
The only real addition to the call setupis the small encryption packet and the SID added to each packet. Although this would add a slight delay to the call setup time, it would not have much effect on the call quality. Also, the use of the options field in the standard IP header makes it easy to implement on many systems. This makes the proposed protocol very universal and compatible with many other systems and protocols. Drawbacks: One of the major drawbacks of this protocol is the addition of two packets that must be sent before the call setup takes place, thereby adding a slight delay to the call setup. Also, because the SID is being added to every packet, the overall packet size is increased. This will add a slight delay to the actual voice conversation. Another disadvantage is that this protocol could only be used on an ISP gateway as long as all of the companies connecting to that gateway were using the new protocol. If the service provider gateway is using this protocol and one of the local gateways is not, then all of the voice calls coming from that local gateway would automatically be dropped. In other words, this protocol is an all-or-nothing protocol -either it is used for all voice gateways or none of them. In addition to the delay and additional packets, the proposed protocol also adds 6 bytes per packet in terms of session ID. However, this overhead is masked by the advantages of the proposed protocol.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, the authors proposed a new VoIP security system that confirms to the wiretap law requirements. It has been proven that with current implementations, law enforcement agencies find it difficult to gather information in real-time. The proposed protocol addresses this issue. With the proposed protocol, every voice gateway that uses encryption to protect voice communication needs to interact with the service provider gateway and register the encryption key. The authenticity of the encryption key can be checked periodically using an offline server. This enables the law enforcement agencies to gather information at the service provider gateways in real time.
While the proposed protocol has certain overhead in terms of additional packets, additional bytes and call setup delay, it has equal amount of advantages. It requires minimal amount of changes at the voice gateway and service provider gateways. The entire system will be transparent to the end users and will not affect the end-to-end voice communication.
Currently the authors are working on implementing the proposed protocol. The authors aim at testing the working of the proposed protocol under various conditions and make it more robust. One of the issues the authors are considering currently is the identification of the voice packets. In the current paper, the authors have assumed that all voice gateways are legitimate and they register themselves with the service provider gateway.
